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INTRODUCTION
When production entails fixed or sunk costs, the number of products
developed can increase with the size of the market. A larger potential
market provides greater reward for firms that can bring a new product to
market. Additional products increase welfare because if products are dif-
ferentiated, then additional products confer benefits by giving more
consumers options that better suit their needs. In this way, consumers
benefit each other via a mechanism one might term "preference external-
ities." Of course, whether or not products are differentiated, additional
products can place downward pressure on prices.'
Although the relationship between market size and consumption
and, by extension, welfare operating through product variety follows
from theory in straightforward ways, corresponding empirical evidence
is scarce. Yet, the conditions giving rise to this phenomenon can appear
whenever fixed costs are large relative to market size. Nowhere is this
more likely to be true than in pharmaceutical markets. According to the
Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, the average cost to de-
velop a new molecular entity is $802 million. The number of drugs
available per condition bears out the claim that drug development costs
are large, relative to market size, for many conditions. The median num-
ber of drugs labeled to treat a four-digit ICD9 condition is two.4 These
1. These mechanisms have been outlined in seminal papers. See Avinash K. Dixit &
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON.
REV. 297 (1977); A. Michael Spence, Product Differentiation and Welfare, 66 AM. ECON. REV.
407 (1976) [hereinafter Spence, Product Differentiation]; A. Michael Spence, Product Selec-
tion, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, 43 REV. ECON. STUD. 217 (1976)
[hereinafter Spence, Product Selection]. See also N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whin-
ston, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency, 17 RAND J. ECON. 48 (1977) (emphasizing possible
inefficiencies of entry).
2. See Lisa George & Joel Waldfogel, Who Affects Whom in Daily Newspaper Mar-
kets?, 111 J. POL. ECON. 765 (2003); Joel Waldfogel, Preference Externalities: An Empirical
Study of Who Benefits Whom in Differentiated-Product Markets, 34 RAND J. ECON. 557
(2003).
3. The Tufts study was based on detailed survey data obtained directly from ten drug
companies. A similar study done by the Tufts Center a decade ago indicated that the average
cost to develop a new drug then was about $231 million, in 1987 dollars. Recent News, Tufts
Center for the Study of Drug Development, Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development
Pegs Cost of a New Prescription Medicine at $802 Million (Nov. 30, 2001),
http://csdd.tufts.edu/NewsEvents/RecentNews.asp?newsid=6.
4. The International Classification of Diseases (ICD) was designed to promote interna-
tional comparability in the collection, processing, classification, and presentation of mortality
statistics. The ICD has been revised periodically to incorporate changes in the medical field. To
date, there have been 10 revisions of the ICD. The ninth revision (ICD9) was used during the
period 1979-1998. The ICD9 classification is hierarchical; a 4-digit ICD9 code is the most de-
tailed code. See Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, International Classification of Diseases, Ninth
Revision (ICD-9) (Jan. 11, 2007), http://www.cdc.gov/nchslaboutlmajor/dvsricd9des.htm. The
figure for the median number of drugs is based on proprietary data provided to Frank Lichten-
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facts lead us to ask whether individuals are better off in their capacity as
drug consumers if their condition is more common. More succinctly, we
ask whether "misery loves company."
Despite the novelty of the academic question of the welfare of small
consumer groups in markets, concern about this issue is not new to pol-
icy makers. The possibility that small populations would see few
medications developed for their conditions has already led the U.S. Con-
gress to pass the 1983 Orphan Drug Act ("ODA"), giving firms special
incentives to develop drugs for diseases afflicting fewer than 200,000
persons per year.5 The ODA contains provisions that reduce the cost, and
raise the appropriability, of research on rare diseases. First, under the
Act, drug makers receive seven years of exclusive marketing upon FDA
approval of newly-developed drugs qualifying as "orphan drugs"-i.e.,
drugs for disorders affecting fewer than 200,000 persons.6 According to
the FDA, this is the "most sought incentive." '7 For seven years following
FDA approval, the FDA cannot approve another drug for the same indi-
cation without the sponsor's consent.8 Second, drug makers qualify for a
tax credit for clinical research expense of up to 50 percent of clinical
testing expense.9 In addition, the FDA provides grant support for investi-
gation of rare disease treatments.' ° Together, these provisions (a) increase
the effective market size; and (b) reduce fixed (sunk) costs. In doing so,
the Act provides a natural experiment for measuring the impact of in-
creased market size, relative to fixed costs, on product development,
consumption, and welfare.
According to the FDA, the ODA has had a large effect on drug
development: "ODA has been very successful-more than 200 drugs and
biological products for rare diseases have been brought to market since
1983. In contrast, the decade prior to 1983 saw fewer than ten such
products come to market."" A complete list of the drugs that have been
granted orphan drug status by the FDA is provided in Appendix
berg by First DataBank. See First DataBank, Drug Indications Master Table (First DataBank's
National Drug Data File CD-ROM, 1999).
5. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (1994)).
6. Id. § 526(a)(2).
7. Marlene E. Haffner, Director, FDA Office of Orphan Drug Prods., From Bench to
Bedside to Practice: A Practical Course--Genetic Alliance Annual Conference (July 28,
2006), slide 6, available at http://www.geneticalliance.org/ksc-assets/pdfs/conf06/incentives-
to-drug-development.ppt.
8. Orphan Drug Act § 527(a)(3).
9. See 26 U.S.C. § 45C (2008).
10. See Information on the OOPD Grant Program, http://www.fda.gov/orphan/
grants/info.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
11. Welcome to the Office of Orphan Products Development, http://www.fda.gov/
orphan/history.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
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Table l" Figure 1 shows the cumulative number of orphan and non-
orphan drugs approved, 1979-1998, as a percent of the cumulative num-
ber of drugs approved in 1979.
FIGURE I
CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF DRUGS APPROVED, AS PERCENTAGE
OF CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF DRUGS APPROVED IN 1979:
ORPHAN VS. OTHER DRUGS
600%
500%
400% --- orphan -U-other
300%
200%
100%
0%
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Between 1979 and 1983, the number of orphan drugs increased at
about the same rate as the number of other drugs. By 1998, there were
more than five times as many orphan drugs as there had been in 1979,
and fewer than twice as many non-orphan drugs.
In light of the apparent effect of the ODA on drug development, we
examine its effect on two measures related to welfare: consumption and
mortality. First, we ask whether there is evidence, in the pharmaceutical
context, that misery loves company. We compare across conditions with
different levels of prevalence ("market size"), asking whether physicians
are more likely to prescribe drugs for common diseases, and whether
people with common diseases are likely to live longer. Results from this
approach are highly suggestive: more prevalent conditions have substan-
tially more products available, and we document both that larger affected
populations are much more likely to take a drug than smaller affected
patient populations, and that mortality rates are lower for persons with
more common conditions. A shortcoming of this approach, however, is
the possibility of unobserved heterogeneities leading both to large mar-
12. Some of these drugs also have non-orphan indications: i.e., they may be used to
treat common diseases.
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kets and many drugs. Putting this differently, the cross-sectional meas-
urement strategy may not reflect a clean source of exogenous variation
in market size.
Conveniently, the passage of the Orphan Drug Act provides a source
of exogenous variation in market size, relative to fixed costs, for drugs
targeting small populations. This motivates our second measurement
approach for documenting the effect of market size on drug consumption
and, by extension, welfare. We document growth in consumption and
increases in longevity for individuals with less common conditions, rela-
tive to those with more common conditions. Moreover, we document
that these effects on consumption and longevity are significantly related
to orphan drug use for the condition.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background by
outlining the mechanism underlying preference externalities. We also
review relevant literature in this Part. Part II describes the data used in
this study. Part III presents our empirical strategy and results. We find
clear cross-sectional evidence that misery loves company, both before
and after the passage of the Orphan Drug Act. But the Act appears to
have weakened the link between market size and welfare: conditions
with substantial orphan drug use have larger increases in consumption
and longevity than others. In the conclusion, we consider our results in
both narrow and broad contexts.
I. MARKET SIZE, ENTRY, AND WELFARE:
WHY WOULD MISERY LOVE COMPANY?
This Article is mainly concerned with the positive question of how
market size affects drug development, consumption, and other measures
of welfare. It is helpful to locate this problem in its normative context,
which we briefly do below.
When development carries sunk costs and products are imperfect
substitutes, markets can fail to achieve optimal outcomes.13 First, if sell-
ers cannot capture the entire consumer valuation of their product, some
products with consumer valuation in excess of their production cost will
not be developed. That is, inefficient under-provision is possible. At the
same time, because products are substitutes, the private benefit of entry
can exceed the resulting social benefit if some of a product's business is
13. These problems are the subject of important theoretical papers. See Dixit & Stiglitz,
supra note 1; Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 1; Spence, Product Selection, supra
note 1.
Spring 2009]
340 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 15:335
diverted from other products. 4 For illustration, consider an additional
identical product. It imposes its fixed cost on society, but adds no con-
sumer benefit (except, possibly, reduced prices). It is possible, as a
result, for markets to support inefficient overprovision of products with
sufficient total demand to cover the costs of multiple products. Spence
terms the process by which the market determines what to produce the
"product selection" problem. 15
Some products that the market selects not to produce are candidates
for the "inefficient under-provision" designation. Indeed, one can view
the ODA as an attempt to remedy inefficient under-provision. In this
case, the reason the allocation may be inefficient is presumably the in-
ability to price discriminate.
We envision firms introducing competing products as long as it is
profitable to do so. Competing products are imperfect substitutes for one
another. Different products in a category work better for different pa-
tients, so that additional products in a category may draw additional
persons to consumption. A sufficient, although not necessary, condition
for additional products to increase welfare is that additional products
raise the tendency for patients to consume a drug in the category corre-
sponding to their condition. We assume that drug development carries
only fixed (sunk) costs. 16 The presence of more products creates greater
potential for consumers to find a product closer to their ideal. Unless
pricing extracts all surplus, consumer welfare is greater."
The "business stealing vs. market expansion" distinction provides a
helpful framework for viewing the relationship between consumption
and welfare. 8 If a new drug is substantially differentiated, it may draw
new customers into the market rather than simply diverting business
away from existing products. In this case, the share of affected people
14. Lichtenberg and Philipson provide evidence that the present discounted value of a
pharmaceutical innovator's returns is reduced more by competition from other brands ("crea-
tive destruction") prior to patent expiration than it is by competition from generic
manufacturers after patent expiration. Frank R. Lichtenberg & Tomas J. Philipson, The Dual
Effects of Intellectual Property Regulations: Within- and Between-Patent Competition in the
U.S. Pharmaceuticals Industry, 45 J.L. & EcON. 643 (2002).
15. Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note I.
16. Drugs cost a great deal to develop, but this development cost does not vary with the
number of doses produced or sold. Hence the costs are fixed and not variable.
17. We recognize that a higher tendency to consume in a cross section does not neces-
sarily reflect higher welfare. Welfare is not higher if 80 percent of people are barely willing to
consume than if 79 percent of persons consume and derive substantial surplus. On the other
hand, if the arrival of a new product-without withdrawal of existing products-raises the
tendency to consume, then by revealed preference, welfare would be higher. We will treat
consumption tendencies as suggestive evidence about welfare in this Article, paying particular
attention to results from longitudinal measurement approaches.
18. See Mankiw & Whinston, supra note I.
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consuming a drug will increase with entry. On the other hand, an undif-
ferentiated product may draw all of its business from existing products
and will therefore not increase the tendency to consume. Of course, ad-
ditional products can put downward pressure on prices, and this pressure
is presumably more acute, as the products are less differentiated.' 9
In this scheme, it is easy to see how misery loves company. An in-
crease in market size raises the amount of revenue available to a product
category, possibly justifying the development of an additional product.
An additional product may attract a new customer (who values the prod-
uct above its price) whose use of the product generates some
combination of consumer surplus and greater longevity. Furthermore,
additional products may reduce the price paid by all customers.
The passage of the ODA increases the effective size of the market,
relative to fixed costs, for drugs targeting uncommon conditions. This
may give rise to more products in those categories, as well as a greater
tendency to consume. Because rare conditions are targeted by few prod-
ucts, especially prior to the ODA, new products spurred by the ODA are
likely to be strongly differentiated products-that is, their entry provides
some product, as opposed to no product.
The foregoing suggests the following questions: do larger markets
attract more products? Is there a greater tendency to consume in markets
with either more products or lower prices, or both? Do additional prod-
ucts promote longevity? We now turn to the empirical analysis of these
questions.
II. DATA
The basic data for this study are information on disease prevalence,
prescription drug consumption, and longevity, by 3-digit ICD-9 disease
code, in 1979 and 1998. These observations occur before and fairly long
after the 1983 ODA, respectively. In addition, we have information on
the fraction of prescriptions written for orphan drugs between 1995 and
2000. Our data are drawn from two sources, which we describe below.
A. Physician Survey Data on Drug Consumption
and Condition Prevalence
Our primary data on drug consumption and prevalence are drawn
from a physician survey, the National Ambulatory Medical Care Surveys
19. This mechanism has been documented indirectly based on the relationship between
market size and entry. See Timothy F. Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss, Entry and Competition in
Concentrated Markets, 99 J. POL. ECON. 977 (1991); Timothy F Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss,
Entry in Monopoly Markets, 57 REV. EON. STUD. 531(1990).
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("NAMCS"). The NAMCS surveys offer information on patients' visits
to a national sample of office-based physicians. The universe consists of
office visits to non-federally employed physicians classified by the
American Medical Association ("AMA") or the American Osteopathic
Association ("AOA") as "office-based, patient care"--excluding special-
ties of anesthesiology, pathology, and radiology-from 112 Primary
Sampling Units ("PSUs") in the United States.
Each NAMCS office visit record reports the following: the physi-
cian's diagnoses (usually only one), any drugs ordered, administered, or
provided, and a sampling weight. We measure condition i's prevalence in
a year based on the number of visits with primary diagnosis i. In particu-
lar, we define:
N_VISITPRE = the estimated annual number of office-based
physician visits in which 3-digit ICD9 diagnosis i was recorded
in the pre-ODA period (1980-1981)'0; and
NVISITPOST. = the estimated annual number of office-based
physician visits in which 3-digit ICD9 diagnosis i was recorded
in the post-ODA period (1997-1998).
Thus, the NAMCS-based prevalence measure is based only on physician
visits. The advantage of this sampling condition is that physician diagno-
ses are more likely to be correct than self-diagnoses. At the same time,
this sampling has the possible disadvantage of excluding persons who
are ill but who do not seek medical care.
We measure drug consumption tendencies from prescription infor-
mation in the NAMCS in two ways. Our first measure is whether
patients diagnosed with a condition have one or more drugs prescribed
for them. The "consumption" measure is therefore based not literally on
consumption but rather on whether the physician believes beneficial
drugs exist for the individual's circumstance. In particular, the fraction of
visits with primary diagnosis i in which one or more drugs were pre-
scribed were defined as follows:
RX%_PRE,. = visits in which any medications were prescribed
as a fraction of total visits in which 3-digit ICD9 diagnosis i was
recorded in the pre-ODA period (1980-1981); and
RX%_POST = visits in which any medications were prescribed
as a fraction of total visits in which 3-digit ICD9 diagnosis i was
recorded in the post-ODA period (1997-1998).
20. NAMCS was conducted in 1980, 1981, 1985, and annually since 1989.
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Our second consumption measure is the average number of drugs pre-
scribed per visit, by condition.
B. Longevity and Prevalence Data from Vital Statistics
Our data on longevity, as well as a second measure of prevalence,
are drawn from Vital Statistics-Multiple Cause of Death files." Two
items that are recorded on death certificates are the cause of death, and
the age at death. The number of non-infant deaths due to a condition is
our second measure of prevalence. We measure longevity using the per-
centage of non-infant deaths occurring before age 55 due to a condition.
C. Orphan Drug Use
The third piece of information for this study is a measure of orphan
drug use. We use the percentage of 1995-2000 prescriptions, by 3-digit
ICD-9 condition, that are for the orphan drugs listed in Appendix Table 1.
These data are drawn from NAMCS.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on prevalence and consumption
measures from the NAMCS survey and the Vital Statistics mortality
data. We restrict attention to the 479 3-digit ICD-9 codes for which all
variables are available. The first two columns report unweighted means,
while the latter two columns report means weighted by contemporane-
ous MD visit prevalence measures. All measures of prevalence increase
over time as do all of the measures of drug consumption. The share of
deaths occurring among the young declines over time in both weighted
and unweighted measures. We do not observe orphan drug use for the
early period, although we can safely assume it is close to zero. By con-
trast, roughly 5 percent of prescriptions written between 1995 and 2000
are for orphan drugs. The median is 3.3 percent, while the 25th and 75th
percentiles of the distribution are 0.3 percent and 8.1 percent, respec-
tively.
III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND RESULTS
A. Empirical Strategy
Our goal in this Article is to measure the effect of market size on
consumer welfare in drug markets, and we employ two empirical strate-
gies. First, we exploit cross-sectional comparisons across conditions
with different levels of prevalence-i.e., "market size"-asking whether
21. Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Mortality Data-Vital Statistics NCHS's Multiple
Cause of Death Data, 1959-2005 (Mar. 6, 2008), http://www.nber.org/data/vital-statistics-
mortality-data-multiple-cause-of-death.html.
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physicians are more likely to prescribe drugs to patients with more
prevalent conditions. The inherent difficulty with this approach, how-
ever, is the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity leading both to large
markets and many drugs.
Fortunately, the passage of the Orphan Drug Act provides a source
of exogenous variation in market size for drugs targeting small popula-
tions. Using panel data at two points in time, together with a measure of
orphan drug use, we can exploit this policy change to provide more
compelling evidence of the effects of market size on consumption and
mortality than one might find using cross-sectional comparisons across
medical conditions alone. As a useful byproduct of this approach, we can
also simply examine the effectiveness of the Orphan Drug Act.
B. Prevalence and Consumption Using Physician Survey Data
Do persons with more common conditions have a greater tendency
to take a drug? First, we estimate cross-condition relationships between
the tendency to take a drug and condition prevalence, via the following
equations:
RX%-PRE, = a0 + P,0 In (NVISITPREi) + E,0  (1)
RX%_POST = ca, + P, In (NVISITPOST) + F, (2)
where equation (1) characterizes the pre-ODA period and equation (2)
characterizes this relationship in the post-ODA period. We recognize that
these are very parsimonious specifications of what are, essentially, de-
mand equations. It would be natural to also include drug price as an
explanatory variable. We experimented with a number of price measures
and found little sensitivity of consumption to prices, perhaps owing to
the role of insurance in financing prescription drug expenditures. We
also include specifications using the mortality-based prevalence meas-
ure, as well as both measures. All regressions are weighted by the
contemporaneous MD visit prevalence measure.
The estimates are reported in Appendix Table 2. Consistent with our
expectations, probability of drug use is higher for more prevalent dis-
eases both before and after enactment of the ODA in all specifications.
That is, misery loves company in the sense that persons with more preva-
lent conditions are more likely to find a suitable prescription drug. The
dependence of drug use on the MD visit prevalence measure declines
after the enactment of the ODA. Using the pre-ODA estimates in the first
column, 45 percent of persons with a condition in the 25th percentile of
prevalence would take a drug, compared with 62 percent of persons with
a condition in the 75th prevalence percentile. By contrast, the column 4
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post-ODA estimates indicate that 45 percent of persons in the 25th
prevalence percentile receive a prescription, compared with 59 percent in
the 75th percentile.
It is possible that the cross sectional relationship between consump-
tion and prevalence arises because of unobserved heterogeneity. Some
factors determining consumption may be correlated with prevalence for
reasons outside our explanation.22 Because we have consumption data at
two points in time, we can eliminate the fixed unobservable by differenc-
ing. We can then test whether the change in consumption is larger for the
conditions for which patients take orphan drugs. It is also possible that
drug consumption is growing at different rates for conditions with differ-
ent levels of prevalence. To avoid attributing a general prevalence effect
to orphan drug use, we also include measures of condition prevalence in
the regressions as follows:
ARX% i = (A + 3 A In (NVISITPRE,) + A (%orphani) + FiA (3)
where
ARX%i = RX%_POST/- RX%_PRE
Finally, we include regressions controlling for prevalence with
dummies for prevalence quintiles according to 1979 MD visits. Appen-
dix Table 3 reports results of these regressions. The change in the
tendency to have a drug prescribed bears a positive and generally signifi-
cant relationship to the orphan drug measure. This relationship survives
the inclusion of controls for condition prevalence. The range of point
estimates falls between 0.16 and 0.3. Between 1979 and 1998, the ten-
dency to have some drug prescribed increases from 71 percent to 73
percent. At the mean level of orphan drug use, approximately 5 percent,
orphan drugs raise the tendency to have a drug by between 0.8 percent
and 1.5 percent points beyond the baseline increase with time. At the
90th percentile of orphan drug use (16 percent), the effect is between 2.5
percent and 5 percent points. The orphan effects on whether one has a
drug prescribed are large relative to the overall increase in this measure.
Appendix Tables 4 and 5 revisit the relationships in Tables 2 and 3
with a different measure of consumption: the number of drugs prescribed
rather than the tendency to have any prescriptions. In Appendix Table 4,
as in Appendix Table 2, drug use increases in market size. Using this
measure of consumption, misery loves company. In contrast with the
22. For example, the measure of prevalence used in these regressions, doctor visits
where a condition is diagnosed, may be driven by the known availability of particular medica-
tions, e.g., Viagra. Other measurement approaches we employ, including both longitudinal
data and mortality-based prevalence measures, avoid these problems. Death is not endogenous
in the same way as doctor visits.
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consumption results based on the share consuming, here, the dependence
of consumption on market size is higher after the ODA than before.
Similarly, in Appendix Table 5, as in Appendix Table 3, the number
of drugs prescribed increases more quickly as our orphan drug measure
is higher. The mean number of drugs taken increases by 0.26 between
1979 and 1998 (see Appendix Table 1). At the mean of orphan drug use
(0.05), the orphan effect adds between 0.02 and 0.05 to the baseline in-
crease in drugs taken; at the 90th percentile of orphan drug use, the
effect is between 0.06 and 0.17. In contrast with results on whether one
takes a drug, the orphan effects on number of drugs taken are small.
C. Mortality and Prevalence
Although product consumption is the usual economic measure un-
derlying welfare inferences, the medical context provides other intuitive
measures of welfare. We can use mortality data to examine the relation-
ship between prevalence and longevity, as measured by the percent of
persons, among those dying of a condition, dying before age 55. Our
empirical approaches are analogous to those above.
Appendix Table 6 shows cross sectional regressions of our longevity
measure on the prevalence measures. In all cases, conditions that are
more prevalent have lower fractions of their deaths occurring young. A
disease at the 25th prevalence percentile (by MD visits) in 1979 has 21
percent of its deaths occurring young, compared with 13 percent dying
young for conditions in the 75th prevalence percentile. In 1998, the per-
centage of deaths occurring young for conditions at the 25th prevalence
percentile had fallen by 6 percentage points to 16 percent, while the per-
centage of deaths occurring young for more common conditions-in the
75th percentile-had fallen only two percentage points, to 11 percent.
Both before and after the ODA, misery loves company in the sense that
more prevalent conditions have greater longevity. Furthermore, the de-
pendence of longevity on prevalence declines following the ODA.
Finally, Appendix Table 7 shows that the change over time in lon-
gevity is larger-the percent dying young declines more-for conditions
with more orphan drug consumption." Overall, the percentage dying
before the age of fifty five falls by 6.7 percentage points (from 25.6 per-
cent to 18.9 percent). For a disease with the mean orphan drug use, the
additional orphan-related decline is 0.2-0.4 percentage points; for a con-
23. This is consistent with evidence that, in general, medical conditions with greater
increases in the number of drugs available exhibit greater increases in longevity-as measured
by the mean age at death. See Frank Lichtenberg, Pharmaceutical Innovation, Mortality Re-
duction, and Economic Growth, in MEASURING THE GAINS FROM MEDICAL RESEARCH: AN
ECONOMIC APPROACH 74 (Kevin M. Murphy & Robert H. Topel eds., 2003).
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dition at the 90th percentile of orphan drug use, the additional decline is
0.8-1.3 percentage points.
D. Discussion: The ODA's Effects and Context
The effects of the ODA are visible in a variety of ways in our results.
Prior to the ODA, drug availability-and ensuing welfare-were more
sensitive to market size. We see this primarily in the contrast between the
pre- and post-ODA estimates of the relationship between share consum-
ing and prevalence. The ODA increased the incentive for firms to
develop drugs for small populations, relative to the incentive for larger
populations. As a result, there was a sharper growth in the drug con-
sumption tendency in low-prevalence conditions than in more common
conditions. Similarly, there was a large decrease in mortality for low-
prevalence conditions relative to higher-prevalence conditions. The ODA
decreased the extent to which misery loves company. It is not clear
whether these effects are efficient, although if the Act simply allows
more complete appropriation of drug benefits, then there would be no
reason to suspect inefficiency.
Most observers of the ODA applaud this policy precisely for its ef-
fect of reducing the dependence of welfare on market size. Intuitively, in
the context of disease, it is not hard to understand the popularity of this
policy. Yet, the conditions facing would-be consumers of drugs for un-
popular conditions are not unique to pharmaceutical markets. These
conditions arise, generically, whenever there are large fixed costs and
preferences that differ across consumers.
The process by which markets select which products to make causes
markets to deliver more welfare to persons with common preferences
than to persons with uncommon ones. As Spence has emphasized, there
is no reason to expect the market to select the right mix of products in
contexts of this sort.24 As we consider the sense of the ODA, we might
also ask whether other policies aimed at raising the welfare of small con-
sumer groups are also justified.
Some commentators believe that investment is not too sensitive to
incentives (e.g., patent enforcement, price controls). They doubt that
weakening patent protection or imposing price controls would signifi-
cantly reduce investment in new drug development.26 Our evidence
supports the hypothesis that at least one type of incentive, the extent of
24. Spence, Product Differentiation, supra note 1.
25. See, e.g., Public Citizen, Would Lower Prescription Drug Prices Curb Drug Com-
pany Research & Development?, http://www.citizen.org/congress/reformdrug-industry/rd/
articles.cfm?ID=7909 (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
26. Id.
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the market, has an important effect on the amount of investment. It may
shed light on the effect of changes in other incentives on investment. For
example, a government-mandated 25 percent price reduction may have a
similar effect on investment as a ("market-mandated") 25 percent reduc-
tion in prevalence.
CONCLUSION
The results show two things. First, the results show that in this mar-
ket, as in some others, supply-side non-convexities give rise to an
important relationship between market size and consumption and, argua-
bly, welfare. In this context, misery loves company. This has broad
implications. First, market size matters in providing incentives for prod-
uct development.
Second, the results show that the prevailing, and generally implicit,
view is that market allocation, unlike allocation through collective
choice, gives each consumer whatever she wants, regardless of her fel-
low consumers' preferences. Given the large drug development costs,
however, consumers see drugs developed for their conditions only as
they make up large potential markets. Our results are, frankly, not sur-
prising; but they do provide some evidence about how the mix of
differentiated products selected in a market depends on the distribution
of product-preferring types in the market.
Third, the results show that the Orphan Drug Act "works" in the
sense that it has induced increased development of drugs targeted at
small populations and that these populations are now more likely to take
drugs. The policy has had the effect of reducing disparities in wellbeing
between large and small populations. Other government policies also
promote this objective. Perhaps most notably, the U.S. Postal Service has
an explicit policy of charging the same rates for postage regardless of
letter origin or destination within the United States. If mail pricing were
left entirely to the market, postage rates would presumably be lower for
letters sent to and from densely populated areas. Under government pro-
vision, by contrast, administered rates are the same for consumers with
substantially different costs of service, in densely and sparsely populated
areas.
It is becoming increasingly clear that in large-fixed cost contexts
where preferences differ across individuals, markets deliver fewer prod-
ucts and perhaps less satisfaction to small groups. In the pharmaceutical
market, this is deemed a bad feature of market outcomes; and policies
have been devised to remedy the situation. Yet, there is no clear distinc-
tion between the economic circumstances of pharmaceutical markets and
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other large-fixed-cost markets. How widely such a policy rationale
should be applied is remains an important question for policymakers.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Unweighted
Pre-ODA
(1978)
Post-ODA
(1998)
Weighted
Pre-ODA
(1978)
Post-ODA
(1998)
MD Visits (mil) 0.76 1.04 5.69 7.16
Deaths 3601.34 4478.90 8551.9 11087.7
% Dying Young 31.23% 27.60% 25.59% 18.87%
Share w/Rx 0.59 0.64 0.71 0.73
Mean Rxs 1.16 1.51 1.40 1.66
Orphan % of Rx (1995-2000) 1 5.94% 4.45%
N (3-digit ICD-9 codes) 479 479 479 479
Notes: weighted means are weighted by contemporaneous MD visits.
TABLE 2: SHARE CONSUMING A DRUG AND PREVALENCE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share Share Share Share Share Share
Getting Rx Getting Rx Getting Rx Getting Rx Getting Rx Getting Rx
Pre Pre Pre Post Post Post
Log MD Visits 0.0657 0.0638
(pre)
(0.0063)* (0.0060)"
Log Deaths 0.0176 0.0079
1979
(0.0033)" (0.0030)"
Log MD Visits 0.0573 0.0537
(post)
(0.0051)" (0.0052)*
Log Deaths 0.0127 0.0083
1998
(0.0024)*" (0.0022)**
Constant -0.2570 0.8630 -0.1591 -0.1406 0.8288 -0.0182
(0.0940)" (0.0296)" (0.0971) (0.0782) (0.0212)** (0.0839)
Observations 479 479 479 479 479 479
R-squared 0.18 0.06 0.22 0.21 0.05 0.23
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
All regressions weighted by contemporaneous MD visits.
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TABLE 3
CHANGE IN SHARE CONSUMING A DRUG, PREVALENCE,
AND ORPHAN DRUG USE
(1) (2) (3) (4) 1 (5) 1 (6) 1 (7) (8)
Change In
Share
Consuming
Rx
Change In
Share
Consuming
Rx
Changein
Share
Consuming
Rx
Changeln
Share
Consuming
Rx
Changein
Share
Consuming
Rx
Changein
Share
Consuming
Rx
Changein
Share
Consuming
Rx
Changein
Share
Consuming
Fx
Log MD Visits -0.0172 -0.0156 -0.0158
(pre)
(0.0034)" (0.0036)" (0.0037)"
Log Deaths -0.0008 -0.0016 0.0004
1979
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018)
Orphan % 0.3095 0.1692 0.3247 0.1637 0.2534
of Rxs 1 1
(0.1065)" (0.1094) (0.1078)" (0.1124) (0.1085)*
Prevalence -0.0487 -0.0538
Quintile 2
(0.0769) (0.0765)
Quintile 3 1 -0.0004 -0.0019
(0.0720) (0.0717)
Quintile 4 -0.0417 -0.0418
(0.0703) (0.0700)
Quintile 5 -0.0664 -0.0613
(0.0693) (0.0690)
Constant 0.2712 0.0117 0.0047 0.2398 -0.0097 0.2464 0.0769 0,0619
(0.0504)." (0.0156) (0.0069) (0.0543)" (0.0171) (0.0624)" (0.0690) (0.0690)
Observations 479 479 479 479 479 479 479 479
R-squared 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
All regressions weighted by 1998 MD visits.
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TABLE 4
MEAN DRUGS CONSUMED AND PREVALENCE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean # Rx Mean # Rx Mean # Rx Mean # Rx Mean # Rx Mean # Rx
Pre Pre Pre Post Post Post
Log MD Visits 0.1390 0.1138
(pre)
(0.0177)** (0.0155)**
Log Deaths 0.1034 0.0798
1979
(0.0079)** (0.0077)**_____
Log MD Visits 0.1502 0.0991
(post)
(0.0201)*" (0.0163)**
Log Deaths 0.1248 0.1167
1998
(0.0072)** (0.0071)**
Constant -0.6560 2.2681 0.3959 -0.6139 2.6730 1.1090
(0.2628)* (0.0702)* (0.2502) (0.3051)* (0.0625)" (0.2646)"
Observations 479 479 479 479 479 479
R-squared 0.11 0.26 0.30 0.10 0.39 0.43
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
All regressions weighted by contemporaneous MD visits.
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TABLE 5
CHANGE IN MEAN DRUGS, PREVALANCE, AND ORPHAN DRUG USE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 1 (6) 1 (7) (8)
Change Change in Change in Change in Change
in Mean # Mean# Mean # Mean # in Mean #
Rx Rx Rx Rx Rx
Change in
Mean #
Rx
Change in
Mean #
Rx
Change ir
Mean #
Rx
Log MD Visits -0.0160 -0.0062 -0.0286
(pre)
(0.0115) (0.0120) (0.0118).
Log Deaths 0.0371 0.0371 0.0407
1979
(0.0055)* (0.0055)* (0.0056)*
Orphan % of 0.7250 1.0773 1.0218 0.7250 0.4340 1.0772
Rxs
(0.3379)* (0.3493)** (0.3658)" (0.3379)* (0.3570) (0.3587)*
Prevalence -0.1216 -0.1434
Quintile 2
(0.2550) (0.2530)
Quintile 3 -0.0810 -0.0873
(0.2389) (0.2369)
Quintile 4 -0.1962 -0.1967
(0.2333) (0.2314)
Quintile 5 -0.1726 -0.1512
(0.2298) (0.2280)
Constant 0.5102 0.5601 0.2277 0.3206 0.5601 1.0227 0.4441 0.3804
(0.1697)* (0.0535)" (0.0225)* (0.1817) (0.0535)* (0.1981)*- (0.2290) (0.2281)
Observations 479 479 479 479 479 479 479 479
R-squared 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.02
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
All regressions weighted by 1998 MD visits in the condition.
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TABLE 6
PERCENT DYING YOUNG AND PREVALENCE
(1) 1 (2) 1 (3) 1 (4) 1 (5) (6)
% Dying
Young,
1979
% Dying
Young,
1979
% Dying
Young,
1979
% Dying
Young,
1998
% Dylng
Young,
1998
% Dying
Young,
1998
Log MD -0.0324 -0.0143
Visits (pre)
(0.0037)** (0.0043)**
Log Deaths -0.0353 -0.0278
1979
(0.0032)** (0.0039)**
Log MD -0.0218 -0.0069
Visits (post)
(0.0032)" (0.0035)*
Log Deaths -0.0339 -0.0301
1998
(0.0031)** (0,0037)**
Constant 0.5601 0,0116 0.2270 0.4017 -0.0058 0.1003
(0.0497)** (0,0119) (0.0665)** (0.0432)** (0.0115) (0.0547)
Observations 479 479 479 479 479 479
R-squared 0.14 0.20 0.22 0.09 020 0.20
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
All regressions weighted by contemporaneous deaths in the condition.
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TABLE 7
CHANGE IN PERCENT DYING YOUNG, PREVALENCE,
AND ORPHAN DRUG CONSUMPTION
( (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) M (8)
Change ir
% Dying
Young
Change Ir
% Dying
Young
Change In
% Dying
Young
Change in
% Dying
Young
Change in
% Dying
Young
Change in
% Dying
Young
Change In
% Dying
Young
Change in
% Dying
Young
Log MD Visits 0.0068 0.0067 0.0030 0.0029
(pre)
(0.0013)" (0.0013)" (0.0015)' (0.0015)
Log Deaths 0.0078 0.0078 0.0063 0.0063
1979
(0.0011)** (0.001 1)" (0.0014)" (0.0014)"
Orphan % of -0.0782 -0.0824 -0.0793 -0.0515Rxs
(0.0373)' (0.0366)' (0.0365)' (0.0376)
Prevalence 0.0081 0.0098
Quintile 2 1
(0.0113) (0.0113)
Quintile 3 -0.0228 -0.0197
(0.0105)' (0.0107)
Quintile 4 0.0114 0.0135
(0.0094) (0.0095)
Quintile 5 0.0256 0.0270
(0.0094)" (0.0094)"
Constant -0.1152 0.0051 -0.1076 0.0110 -0.0409 -0.0330 -0.0351 -0.0330
(0.0170)" (0.0047) (0.0173)** (0.0054)* (0.0232) (0.0234) (0.0087)** (0.0089)"
Observations 479 479 479 479 479 479 479 479
R-squared 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.11 0,10 0,11
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
All regressions weighted by the 1998 deaths in the condition.
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TABLE 8
DRUGS THAT HAVE BEEN GRANTED ORPHAN DRUG
STATUS BY THE FDA27
Albendazole Etanercept Naltrexone Hydrochloride
Aldesleukin Ethanolamine Oleate Nitric Oxide
Alglucerase Etidronate Disodium Octreotide Acetate
Alitretinoin Exemestane Ofloxacin
Allopurinol Factor IX (Human) Oprelvekin
Altretamine Felbamate Paclitaxel
Amifostine Filgrastim Pegademase Bovine
Aminosalicylic Acid Fludarabine Phosphate Pegaspargase
Amiodarone Hydrochloride Follitropin Alfa Pentamidine Isethionate
Amphotericin B Fomepizole Pentastarch
Amphotericin B Lipid Complex Fosphenytoin Sodium Pentosan Polysulfate Sodium
Anagrelide Hydrochloride Ganciclovir Sodium Pentostatin
Antihemophilic Factor Gemtuzumab Ozogamicin Pilocarpine
(Recombinant)
Antithrombin III (Human) Glatiramer Acetate Poractant Alfa
Aprotinin Bovine Gonadorelin Acetate Porfimer Sodium
Atovaquone Halofantrine Hydrochloride Potassium Citrate
Baclofen Hemin Proteinase Inhibitor (Human), Alpha 1
Basiliximab Histrelin Acetate Respiratory Syncytial Virus Immune
Globulin
Beractant Hydroxyurea Rho (D) Immune Globulin
Betaine, Anhydrous Idarubicin Hydrochloride Rifabutin
Bexarotene Ifosfamide Rifampin
Bleomycin Sulfate Imiglucerase Rifapentine
Botulinum Toxin Immune Globulin (Human) Riluzole
Busulfan Infliximab Rituximab
Caffeine Citrate Interferon Alfa-2a, Sacrosidase
Recombinant
Calcium Acetate Interferon Alfa-2b, Sargramostim
Recombinant
Calfactant Interferon beta-i a Satumomab Pendetide
Cetyl Alcohol; Colfosceril Interferon Beta-lb, Selegiline Hydrochloride
Palmitate; Tyloxapol Recombinant
Chenodiol Interferon Gamma-lb, Sermorelin Acetate
Recombinant
Citric Acid; Glucono-Delta- lobenguane Sulfate 1131 Sodium Benzoate; Sodium
Lactone; Magnesium Carbonate Phenylacetate
Cladribine Isoniazid; Pyrazinamide; Somatrem
Rifampin
Clofazimine Lamotrigine Somatropin, Biosynthetic
Clonidine Hydrochloride Lepirudin (rDNA) Sotalol Hydrochloride
Coagulation Factor VIla Leucovorin Calcium Succimer
(Recombinant)
27. Data obtained from Mosby, Mosby's Drug Consult for Health Professions (2002).
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Corticorelin Ovine Triflutate Leuprolide Acetate Sulfadiazine
Cromolyn Sodium Levocarnitine Temozolomide
Cysteamine Bitartrate Levomethadyl Acetate Teniposide
Hydrochloride
Cytarabine Liposome Lidocaine Teriparatide Acetate
Cytomegalovirus Immune Liothyronine Sodium Thalidomide
Globulin
Daclizumab Lodoxamide Thyrotropin
Tromethamine
Daunorubicin Citrate Liposome Mafenide Acetate Tiopronin
Denileukin Diftitox Mefloquine Hydrochloride Tobramycin
Desmopressin Acetate Megestrol Acetate Toremifene Citrate
Dexrazoxane Hydrochloride Melphalan Tretinoin
Diazepam Mesna Trientine Hydrochloride
Digoxin Immune Fab (Ovine) Methotrexate Sodium Trimetrexate Glucuronate
Dornase Alfa Metronidazole Urofollitropin
Doxorubicin, Liposomal Midodrine Hydrochloride Ursodiol
Dronabinol Mitoxantrone Valrubicin
Hydrochloride
Eflornithine Hydrochloride Modafinil Zalcitabine
Epirubicin Hydrochloride Monoctanoin Zidovudine
Epoetin Alfa Morphine Sulfate Zinc Acetate
Epoprostenol Sodium Nafarelin Acetate
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